Counterinsurgency in Crisis: Britain and the Challenges of Modern Warfare by David H. Ucko & Robert Egnell

Author:David H. Ucko & Robert Egnell [Ucko, David H. & Egnell, Robert]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, Iraq War (2003-2011), Military, Middle Eastern, Political Science, World, Middle East, History, Afghan War (2001-), Terrorism, General
ISBN: 9780231535410
Google: eSjwAAAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 22693683
Publisher: Columbia University Press
Published: 2013-10-08T00:00:00+00:00

A SLOW RESPONSE

It took some years following the occupation of southern Iraq for the British armed forces to react institutionally. Buoyed by the swift overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the relative stability in southern Iraq (compared to the rest of the country), the British armed forces saw no immediate need for reform. At this point, problems experienced in the field were commonly ascribed to the weaknesses of the military’s civilian partners; more than anything, their meager presence and resources in the field were perceived as the campaigns missing link.5 The military was therefore a great supporter of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), a body set up in 2004 to improve interdepartmental coordination for the stabilization of postwar countries.6 The hope was that the PCRU would help involve the Foreign Office and DfID, so that the military could concentrate on its “core” tasks: patrols, raids, and security.

This focus on the civilian agencies was justified, but also problematic. First, concern with civilian weaknesses belied the need for serious reform also within the military, which did not make much headway during these initial years.7 Some steps were taken, such as the quick adaptation of the Operational Training and Advisory Group (OPTAG) and of predeployment training to put more emphasis on local culture, language, and conditions.8 In 2003, Land Forces Standing Order 1118 was issued, which assigned responsibility within the army for a lessons-learned mechanism based on its experiences in Iraq.9 Nonetheless, there was little evidence in 2003–2005 of a more concerted reconsideration of counterinsurgency or of an institutional reorientation toward these types of campaigns.

Second, the military and others were far too hopeful about the government’s ability to “fix” the civil–military imbalance, which skewed expectations of how labor might be divided in future campaigns. On paper, the PCRU promised a great deal: owned jointly by DfID, the Foreign Office, and the MoD, it was mandated to “develop strategy for post conflict stabilisation” and to “plan, implement and manage the UK contribution to post conflict stabilisation.”10 With three masters but none of its own, however, PCRU was burdened by an unclear chain of command and struggled to establish itself. The unit was not declared operational until July 2006, at which point it accounted for twenty-eight personnel, drawn from five government departments, and a yearly budget of £10 million.11 Its civilian parent agencies, DfID and the Foreign Office, lacked “both flexibility in funding arrangements … and career incentives for staff to deploy” and operate in conflict environments.12 At this point, neither these weaknesses nor their long-term implications for the military’s own remit in postconflict settings were grasped. Instead, frustration at the civilian agencies’ current weaknesses and misplaced hope in their swift remediation absolved the military from closer self-scrutiny.

It was not until 2006 that the military took more significant steps to reorient its forces. Three factors brought on this change. First, as security in Basra deteriorated, questions surfaced regarding the British approach to operations there and the need to adapt.13 Second, in its reassessment of the campaign,

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